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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the

decision of the Third Judicial District has the effect of
establishing a rule of law that a Summary Judgment is appropriate
when discovery is still pending.
2.

The decision of the Court of Apeals has the effect of

establishing a rule of law that a court need not take the view
most favorable to the party resisting a Motion for Summary
Judgment.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals as established above
are contrary to established case law as set forth elsewhere in
this petition.

REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORT OF DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
This petition is based upon the decision of the Court of
Appeals of the State of Utah, bearing the caption of this peition
Court of Appeals # 860109-CA dated July 28, 1987. A copy of the
opinion from which this petition is taken is attached n the
appendix.
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
A.

The Judicial decision of the Court of Appeals of the

State of Utah was rendered July 28, 1987.
B.

Pursuant to Rule 45 (e) Petitioner obtained an extension

of time within which to file this Writ.
C.

This Writ is filed within that extension period.
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PROVISIONS OF LAW
The provision of law governing the issues herein arises out
of Rule 56 (Summary Judgment) the pertinent portion thereof is
as follows: Rule 56 (b) & (c) U.R. of C.P. state as follow:
(b) FOR DEFENDING PARTY. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim,, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment
is sought,, may, at any time, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any
part thereof.
(c) MOTION AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. The motion shall be
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing.
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing
affidavits. The judgment wrought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as
to the amount of damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case before the Court involves written and oral lease
agreements.

The case is complex with many issues involved.

The

issues before this Court and or appeal before the Court of Appeals
deal with procedural issues.
1.

After depositions had been taken of the Plaintiff's

President, David Yurthr and of the Principal Defendant, S.M.
Horman, the Defendant's counse filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment.
2.

Defendant had noticed up its motion for summary judgment

to be heard at 8:30 a.m. on November 16, 1984. (R.387)
3.

Present counsel was retained only 24 hours prior to the

hearing (R.388)
-4-

4.

Counsel filed a petition for extraordinary review and

request for additional time to respond to and argue in opposition
to motion for Summary Judgment. (R.387)

That motion was denied.

However, the court gave leave to file a memorandum within 20 days.
(R. 386)
5.

Defendant in support of summary judgment cited

affidavits of-six persons.

Further, the deposition of Sidney

Horman was extensively cited.
6.

Many of the persons named were complete strangers to

Plaintiff and Plaintiff desired and gave notice of taking their
depositions.
7.

Upon receipt of notice of deposition of Sidney Horman

and others, Defendant's counsel responded saying:
With respect to the depositions you have noticed, it is my
understanding of the Judge's ruling that any further discovery
necessarily awaits his ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
Should that motion be granted, there would, of course, be no
further discovery. If the motion shold be denied, I shall be
pleased to cooperate with you in setting dates. (Your notices
conflict with other depositions previously scheduled by me, and I
would not be able to accomodate you in those dates in any event.)
(R. 434)
8.

Plaintiff submitted an affidavit in support of its

motion for extraordinary review. (R. 570)

Said affidavit (R. 576)

alleged the need to take the deposition of nine persons.

Notices

of deposition were served on Roger Evans, Bill Selvig, Mike
Chitwood, William Oswald and Sid Horman. (R. 579, R. 581 through
R. 587)
Defendant would not make himself available for deposition as
is shown above.
-5-

The affidavits submitted by Plaintiff raised issues of fact.
The lower court denied motion to certiorari, denied motion to
compel further discovery and granted summary judgment.
Petitioner feels that said decision was contrary to case law
established by this court.

ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT

POINT 1.

PLAINTIFF, THROUGH COUNSEL, WAS NOT GIVEN THE

OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY TO ADEQUATELY RESPOND TO
DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVITS OF FACT.

It would not greatly have delayed

the proceedings to have allowed the discovery.

The court in Cox

vs. Winters 678 p. 2d 311 (Utah, 1984) stated:
Trial court abused its descretion in denying investors
opportunity to conduct further discovery prior to granting
attorney's motion for summary judgment. .
It is axiomatic that a summary judgment ought not to be granted if
all facts cannot be placed before the court.

-6-

Thus, Plaintiff was told that Plaintiff could not do
discovery necessary to respond

to the summary -judgment motion

until after the decision was entered.

The affidavits of

Defendants were clearly created by Defendant to support its case.
Plaintiff had no opportunity to conduct discovery related to the
alleged facts.

The case is complicated and has resulted in

voluminous pleadings.

(Defendant's counsel even apologizes for

length of his brief. R.323).
Plaintiff requested time and the opportunity to conduct
further discovery.

Such request was denied, and the conducting of

additional discovery would not have prejudiced Defendant.

The

result was that all of the facts were not and are not on the
table.
In a similar fact situation, Auerbachs vs. Kimball, Supreme
Court, State of Utah, November 15, 1977, 572 P. 2d 376, the Court
said:

The granting of the motion for summary judment was
premature, because Kimball's discovery was not then complete. It
was the information sought in the proceedings for discovery, which
Kimball claimed would infuse the issues with facts sufficient to
defeat a motion for summary judgment, and sustain his
counter-claim. Whether such would be the case cannot now be
determined, because such facts, if they exist were not allowed to
be discovered.
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When a motion is made opposing summary judgment, on the
ground discovery has not been completed, the court should grant a
continuance or deny the motion for summary judgment; unless the
motion in opposition is deemed dilatory or without merit. If the
motion for summary judgment is denied, the denial should be
without prejudice to its renewal after an elapse of adequate time
for completion of discovery.
The affidavits and depositions cited have controverted the facts
alleged by Defendant and raise reasonable issues of fact.
POINT IV.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY ONLY BE GRANTED WHERE THERE

IS NO ISSUE OF FACT:
The court is not called upon to weigh evidence or make
findings of fact.

Burningham vs. Ott 525 P. 2d 620 (Utah, 1974).

The court is not permitted to nor required to make findings of
fact but can only find that there are no issues of fact.

Carr vs.

Bradshaw Chevrolet Co. 464 P. 2d 580 23 Ut. 2d 415 (Utah 1970) and
the court cannot consider weight or credibility of witnesses
Singleton vs. Alexander 431 P. 2d 126, 19 Ut. 2d 292.
Further, to sustain a motion for summary judgment, the
pleadings, evidence, admissions and inferences should be most
favorably reviewed from point of view of the party opposing
summary judgment, and must show that there is no issue of material
fact Frederick May & Co. vs. Dunn 368 P. 2d 266, 13 Ut. 2d 40
(Utah, tl962) See also Bowen vs. Riverton City 656 P. 2d 434.
CONCLUSIONS
1.

Plaintiff was not given an opportunity to conduct

discovery necessary to properly place all facts before the court.
2.

The facts upon which Defendant relies have been

controverted.
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3.

The court is required to determine only that there are

no issues of fact.
4.

This is clearly not the case.

Reviews of materials submitted in affidavits and

depositions must be interpreted in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff.
Based upon the foregoing, the decision and opinion of the
Court of Appeals is contrary to established case law of this
court.
Petitioner respectfully requests that this court hear the
issues here presented.
Respectfully Submitted,

Lorin N. Pace
Pace & Parsons
Attorney for Petitioner
350 South 400 East, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 364-1300
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand delivered a copy of the

ir^.day

foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari this I y

of October,

1987 to:
L.R. Gardiner, Chapman & Cutler, 50 South Main, SLC, Ut. 84110

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Downtown Athletic Club,
a Utah Corporation/
Plaintiff and Appellant/

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Case No. 860109-CA
S. M. Horman/ an individual
a/k/a Sid Horman; S. M.
Horman & Sons# a partnership;
and S. M. Horman & Sons Company,
Defendants and Respondents.
S. M. Horman & Sons Company/
Counter-Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Downtown Athletic Club/ a Utah
corporation/ and David G. Yurth,
an individual/
Counter-Defendants and
Appellant.

FILED
JUL 2 3 1987
Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

Before Judges Billings, Garff/ and Jackson.

Billings, Judge:
Appellant/ Downtown Athletic Club (""DAC,,) appeals from the
district court's judgment denying its motion to continue and
its motion to compel further discovery, and granting
respondents' (jointly referred to as HHormanH) motion for
summary judgment. DAC contends that the trial court erred in
ruling as a matter of law that the conditions precedent to the
parties' agreement were not satisfied thus discharging Herman's
obligation to perform. We affirm.
DAC executed a written agreement with S. M. Horman on May
8/ 1981 entitled "Construction & Lease Agreement for the
Downtown Athletic Club" ("Construction & Lease Agreement").
This agreement provided that Horman would construct athletic

clubs and then sublease the clubs to DAC. The Construction &
Lease Agreement delineated several conditions precedent to"
Horman's obligation to perform:
1. Horman would construct improvements to the Harver
Warehouse Building provided that the Harver Warehouse
Building could be reinforced at a price that was
acceptable to both Horman and DAC, and in a manner
that would satisfy the building code requirements of
the Salt Lake City Building Department.
2. Horman was to commence construction only after
confirmed receipt and acceptance by Horman of
construction financing acceptable to Horman, and the
entire lease was specifically subject to Horman being
able to secure sufficient financing at a rate not to
exceed 12% per annum and that DAC should pay all
annual interest charges in excess of 12% per annum
provided Horman did decide to pay a higher interest
rate than 12%.
3. DAC had use of office space in the old Kress
Building only if it paid the nominal rent of $1.00 per
month.
4. Horman was obligated to construct the athletic
clubs only if DAC sold a sufficient number of
memberships prior to beginning construction of the
athletic clubs in order to guarantee that the payments
required by the Construction & Lease Agreement would
be paid.
5. DAC was to assign dues income of individual
membership contracts, by contract number, to a special
account designated solely for the payment of monthly
lease payments to verify that there were sufficient
funds available.
DAC contends that the parties orally modified the
Construction & Lease Agreement by including an assignment of
part of Horman1s leasehold interest in the Harver Warehouse
Building to DAC. This oral agreement also contained conditions
precedent most of which were identical to those enumerated in
the Construction & Lease Agreement:
1. The owners of the Harver Warehouse Building had to
completely and absolutely release Horman from all
obligations under the lease and accept DAC as the new
lessee in place of Horman.
2. Engineering studies had to be completed and
approved by Salt Lake City for the renovation of the
Harver Building.
860109-CA
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3. Adequate financing for the completion of the
construction of the athletic club(s) had to be secured.
Horman served notice on DAC to "quit the premises" after it
sold some of the subject property to the Salt Lake Acquisition
Group* Consequently, DAC filed suit against Horman on seeking
specific performance and damages for breach of the written and
oral agreements* Horman filed its answer and counterclaim for
declaratory judgment/ tortious waste, unlawful detainer, and
slander of title on January 6, 1984.
Comprehensive discovery ensued with each party producing
hundreds of documents. Discovery ended with the depositions of
the two principals. David Yurth, president of DAC, was deposed
on April 2, 1984 resulting in a 283 page transcript, 36
exhibits, and over 13 pages of corrections. S. M. Horman1s
deposition was taken April 26, 1984 resulting in a 245 page
transcript and several exhibits. No further discovery was
conducted by either party.
Horman filed its motion for summary judgment together with
supporting affidavits and a memorandum of points and
authorities on July 19, 1984, nearly two months after the last
deposition was taken and when there were no outstanding
discovery requests. Oral argument on the motion was scheduled
for August 28, 1984. On August 22, 1984, six days before the
motion was to be argued, DACfs counsel moved to withdraw and
requested a 60-day extension to respond to Herman's motion.
The district court granted both of these requests.
Sixty days elapsed without an appearance from DAC and
without response to the motion. Consequently, on October 26,
1984, Horman served written notice on DAC pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-51-36 (1978) requesting that it either appoint
counsel or appear in person. On November 2, 1984, Horman
renoticed its motion for summary judgment and scheduled the
hearing for November 16, 1984. On November 13, 1984, DAC's new
counsel entered an appearance and filed a motion for
continuance, an Hextraordinary request for review,H and noticed
nine depositions all of which were scheduled after the
scheduled oral argument on Horman's summary judgment motion.
On November 16, 1984, the district court heard oral
argument on DAC's motion to continue and Hormanfs motion for
summary judgment. The district court denied DAC's motion to
continue, took Horman*s motion for summary judgment under
advisement, and gave DAC an additional twenty days to file a
written response to Horman's motion for summary judgment. On
December 6, 1984, DAC filed a motion to compel discovery

860109-CA
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seeking to -continue- S. M. Horman's deposition.1 DACfs
motion to compel was supported by an affidavit claiming the
need for further discovery. After receiving several
continuances, DAC filed its memorandum in opposition to
Hormanfs motion for summary judgment on December 10, 1984
together with eight affidavits, some of which were unsworn and
unsigned.
The district court denied DAC's motion to compel further
deposing of S. M. Horman and granted Horman's motion for
summary judgment holding that the oral agreement was void under
the statute of frauds and that Horman was excused from
performing under the Construction & Lease Agreement because
none of the conditions precedent had been performed. This
appeal followed.
Three issues are raised on appeal. First, did the lower
court abuse its discretion in denying DAC's motion to continue
and its motion to compel further discovery? Second, is the
oral modification of the Construction & Lease Agreement void
under the statute of frauds and, if not, do the uncontested
facts demonstrate that Horman was excused from performing under
the terms of the modification? Third, did the lower court err
in granting Herman1s motion for summary judgment ruling that
Horman was excused from performing under the Construction &
Lease Agreement as DAC failed to satisfy the requisite
conditions precedent?
We will review the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to DAC, the party against whom the judgment was
granted. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 229
(Utah 1987).
I.
The first issue we must address is whether the trial court
erred in denying DAC the opportunity to conduct further
discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment. Generally,
summary judgment should not be granted if discovery is
incomplete since information sought in discovery may create
genuine issues of material fact sufficient to dcsfeat the
motion. Auerbach's Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah
1977). However, a court should deny a motion to continue if
the motion opposing summary judgment is dilatory or without
merit. See id.
1. Horman*s counsel refused to allow S. M. Horman, an 80
year-old man who already had been subjected to extensive
cross-examination during the initial deposition, to undergo yet
further deposing until the trial court had ruled on its summary
judgment motion.

860109-CA
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Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a party opposing summary judgment may submit an affidavit
stating the reasons why he is presently unable to present
evidentiary affidavits essential to support his opposition to
summary judgment• If the court finds the reasons to be
adequate, the court may, among other things, order that further
discovery be conducted and continue the summary judgment
motion. The Utah Supreme Court, in Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d
311, 313-14 (Utah 1984), delineated several factors to consider
\ under Rule 56(f) :
1. Were the reasons articulated in the
Rule 56(f) affidavit "adequate" or is the
party against whom summary judgment is
sought merely on a "fishing expedition"
for purely speculative facts after
substantial discovery has been conducted
without producing any significant evidence?
2. Was there sufficient time since the
inception of the lawsuit for the party
against whom summary judgment is sought to
use discovery procedures, and thereby
cross-examine the moving party?
3. If discovery procedures were timely
initiated, was the non-moving party
afforded an appropriate response?
Applying the foregoing legal principles, we find that the
district court properly denied DACfs motion to compel further
deposing of S. H. Horman and its motion to continue the summary
judgment hearing. Both parties conducted extensive discovery.
Hundreds of documents were produced. Lengthy depositions were
taken. The record reveals that DAC failed to conduct further
discovery although it had ample time and opportunity to do so.
Discovery essentially ended on April 26, 1984. Three months
elapsed before Horman filed its motion for summary judgment.
During this three-month period DAC conducted no further
discovery. DAC was given six weeks before oral argument on the
motion for summary judgment in which to conduct any necessary
discovery. Again, DAC sought no further discovery. DAC was
also granted an additional 60-day extension specifically to
respond to Horman's motion when DACfs original counsel withdrew
five days before oral argument was scheduled. These additional
60 days lapsed without DAC entering an appearance or seeking
any additional discovery.

860109-CA
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On November 2, 1984, nearly four months after Horman,filed
its initial motion for summary judgment, and with no action by
DAC to respond to the motion, Horman again noticed its motion
for summary judgment and scheduled oral argument for November
16, 1984 providing DAC yet another two weeks to respond to its
motion. Three days prior to the scheduled oral argument, DAC's
new counsel appeared and finally sought additional discovery by
noticing nine depositions (scheduled after oral argument on the
motion for summary judgment).
On December 6, 1984, DAC moved to compel the* appearance of
S. M. Horman to continue his deposition. DAC's motion to
compel discovery was accompanied by an affidavit by its counsel
claiming the need for further discovery.2 This affidavit,
however, is deficient as a Rule 56(f) affidavit. It fails to
articulate any material area of inquiry not covered by the
original deposition of S. M. Horman. Rather, DAC's counsel
merely states:
Having read the Horman deposition there are a
number of areas into which Mr. Zoll [DAC's
original counsel] did not inquire and
disposition of this case in a prompt and
reasonable manner depends upon prompt access
to the information and alleged testimony
which will be given by Mr. Horman.

There are a number of issues into which the
Plaintiff's counsel Mr. Zoll did not inquire
and notice was given at the end of the day
that the deposition was being continued.
We believe that DAC's counsel was simply on a "fishing
expedition" for purely speculative facts after substantial
discovery had been conducted without producing any significant
evidence- Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d at 312-313, 314. Moreover,
DAC had sufficient time and opportunity before the summary
judgment motion was argued to conduct discovery and in fact did
so.
We also are of the opinion that DAC had ample
opportunity to cross-examine S. M. Horman during his initial
deposition. The deposition took an entire day. At the initial
2. DAC did not identify its affidavit as a Rule 56(f)
affidavit. However, the substance of the affidavit suggests it
was intended to be such. We are controlled by substance, not
captions. Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 P.2d 1346, 1348
(Utah 1983). Therefore, we will treat DAC's affidavit as a Rule
56(f) affidavit.
860109-CA
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deposition DAC's original counsel requested that S. M. Horman
and his counsel be available for two full days. Schedules were
rearranged to meet this request. The deposition was stopped
abruptly at 4:45 p.m. on the first day. Horman was prepared to
proceed further that day and the next as scheduled by DACfs
counsel. DACfs counsel/ however, chose not to proceed.
By way of summary, the record indicates that DAC had
over a year to conduct discovery and had been given several
continuances and extensions by the trial judge. DAC did not
articulate any specific factual area which needed further
probing. Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial
court reasonably concluded that no further factual development
was necessary and properly denied DAC's motion to compel and
its compel to continue.
II.
Next, we must determine if the trial court correctly
found that the alleged oral modification of the Construction &
Lease Agreement did not preclude Horman1s motion for summary
j udgment.
DAC contends that the parties orally modified the
written contract, a contention which Horman disputes, by
including an assignment by Horman of part of its leasehold
interest in the Harver Warehouse Building to DAC. Both parties
agree that Horman contemplated assigning its interest in the
masterlease only if Horman was completely released by the
owners of the Harver Warehouse Building from all obligations
under the lease. The alleged oral modification also contained
two other conditions precedent which were identical to those
identified in the Construction & Lease Agreement. First, DAC
was required to secure "adequate" construction and long-term
financing, and second, DAC was to provide acceptable
engineering reports to Salt Lake City to obtain the appropriate
building permit to reinforce and reconstruct the Harver
Warehouse Building.
DAC concedes that when the statute of frauds requires a
contract to be in writing, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1984), any
alteration or modification must also be in writing. Zion* s
Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975).
DAC, however, argues that the oral modification of the
Construction & Lease Agreement was removed from the bar of the
statute of frauds under the doctrine of partial performance.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (1984).
DAC alleges that it partly performed the oral
modification by attempting to secure the specified construction
and long-term financing, by selling memberships to the clubs,
and by retaining firms to perform the engineering studies. All

860109-CA
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of the acts alleged, including the engineering studies and the
financing, were not exclusively referable to the oral
modification but were also required under the original
Construction & Lease Agreement and thus would not remove the
oral modification from the statute of frauds. See McDonald v.
Barton Bros. Inv. Corp.. 631 P.2d 851, 853 (Utah 1981). More
importantly, however, even if the oral modification was
enforceable, DACfs position still fails. As more fully
developed in section III of this opinion, the conditions
precedent to the oral modification were not satisfied and thus
Herman1s obligation to perform under the oral modification
never arose.
III.
The third issue on appeal is whether the trial court
erred in concluding as a matter of law that none of the
conditions precedent to the written contract were satisfied
thus excusing Horman's obligation to perform.
It is undisputed that all the conditions precedent to
the Construction & Lease Agreement had to be satisfied before
Horman became obligated to construct and ultimately lease the
athletic clubs to DAC. If one condition was not satisfied,
Horman was excused from performing.3 A review of the record
discloses that DAC failed to satisfy several of the conditions
precedent to the written agreement.
As previously discussed, Horman was to make improvements
provided that the Harver Warehouse Building could be reinforced
at a price that was acceptable to both parties, and in a manner
that would satisfy the requirements of the Salt Lake City
Building Department. This provision really contains two
conditions precedent involving engineering studies.
Engineering studies had to be completed before bhe cost of
reinforcement could be determined and before the Building
Department could consider whether to issue the appropriate
permit.
The undisputed facts in the record indicate that
although DAC attempted to have engineering studies performed on
the Harver Warehouse Building, no final engineering study was
3. The Construction & Lease Agreement did not contain an
express Mtime is of the essence* provision. Therefore, DAC had
a reasonable time under the circumstances in which to satisfy
the conditions precedent. Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d
1240, 1242 (Utah 1980). The agreement was executed on May 8,
1981. DAC filed its complaint on September 9, 1983.
Therefore, DAC had over two years to satisfy the conditions.
Neither party questioned whether this was a sufficient amount
of time for DAC to perform.

860109-CA
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Affirmed.

Costs to Horman.

Judith M. Billings, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

R. W. Garff, Judge

860109-CA
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in fact completed much less submitted to the City for
approval.
DAC originally retained Bonneville Engineering to
conduct the engineering studies. DAC later retained Scott
Evans, managing partner of Cornwall Evans & Fife, architects.
Evans in turn hired Ronald Weber of Weber & Associates to
conduct the requisite engineering studies and determine costs.
Scott Evans, in a sworn affidavit, claims that he hired a
structural engineer to Hsuggest appropriate engineering
upgrades or structural reinforcements'* as required by the
City. Scott Evans, however, merely states that the Hresults"
of the engineering study and recommendations for structural
reinforcement and preliminary drawings were presented to Roger
Evans, assistant director of the Department of Building &
Housing Services for Salt Lake City Corporation. Scott Evans
admits that Roger Evans, in a meeting, required final working
drawings of the suggested engineering solutions. Conspicuously
absent from Scott Evans' affidavit is his sworn statement that
he did in fact submit the final engineering drawings and
seismic analysis to the City and that they were approved.
Roger Evans, the assistant director of the Department of
Building & Housing Services for Salt Lake City Corporation, in
his affidavit, states that DAC never submitted any plans,
specifications, engineering reports or the requested seismic
analysis to the Department. In light of Roger Evans' and Scott
Evans' affidavits, it is uncontroverted that the requisite
engineering studies were never submitted to the City.
Consequently, the cost of reinforcement of the Harver Warehouse
Building could not be determined and the City could not approve
such reinforcement. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's
conclusion that this condition precedent was not satisfied and
Horman's obligation to perform under either the original
Construction & Lease Agreement or the alleged oral modification
was excused.
Having found that this one condition precedent has not
been performed, we decline to address whether DAC satisfied any
other conditions because, as previously discussed, aJJL the
conditions precedent had to be satisfied before Horman's
performance was required.
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PACE & PARSONS
350 South 400 East, Suite 101
Salt lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 364-1300
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a
Utah Corporation
Plaintiff & Appellant,
vs.
S.M. HORMAN, an Individual aka
Sid Horman; S.M. Horman & Sons,
a Partnership; & S.M. Horman
& Sons Co.
Defendants & Respondents.

ORDER EXTENDING TIME FOR
FILING WRIT OF CERTIORARI

SUPREME COURT NO.
Court of Appeals No. 86-0109-CA

S.M. HORMAN & SONS CO.
Counter-Plaintiff &
Respondent,
vs.
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a
Utah Corporation, & DAVID
YURTH, an Individual
Counter-Defendants &
Appellant.
Based upon the motion of the appellant here attached
together with the Affidavit of Counsel and good cause therefore
appearing, it is hereby ordered:
That the time within which a petition for a Writ of
Certiorari may be filed is expanded to and including 10 days from
the date of this order to and including the &ttr day of October,

DATED this -adth-day of ^Seplembe* , 1987.
By the C0urt:

'4^t<
Honorable Jud^e

DATED this 29th day of September, 1987.
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Lorin N. Pace

CERTIFICATE OF KAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY chat I Miiuu <. true ana correct copy of
the foregoing Notice o'. Hearing Motion postage prepaid this 29th
day of September, 1937 to: L. Ray Gardiner, Jr., 50 South main,
SLC, Ut. 84101.
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Secretary
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